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Abstract
Sound at frequencies above (ultrasonic) or below (infrasonic)
the range of human hearing can, in some settings, cause ad-
verse physiological and psychological effects to individuals.
In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of cyber-attacks that
could make smart consumer devices produce possibly imper-
ceptible sound at both high (17–21kHz) and low (60–100Hz)
frequencies, at the maximum available volume setting, poten-
tially turning them into acoustic cyber-weapons. To do so, we
deploy attacks targeting different smart devices and take sound
measurements in an anechoic chamber. For comparison, we
also test possible attacks on traditional devices.
Overall, we find that many of the devices tested are capable
of reproducing frequencies within both high and low ranges, at
levels exceeding those recommended in published guidelines.
Generally speaking, such attacks are often trivial to develop
and in many cases could be added to existing malware pay-
loads, as they may be attractive to adversaries with specific
motivations or targets. Finally, we suggest a number of coun-
termeasures, both platform-specific and generic ones.
1 Introduction
Concerns about the potential for malware to harm citizens by
compromising smart consumer devices have become increas-
ingly prevalent [40, 69, 13]. However, while previous research
has extensively focused on “traditional” IoT malware (e.g., ex-
filtrating confidential information [82], mounting Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [38], etc.), less attention has
been paid to the ability to directly cause material harm to users
of compromised systems.
In this paper, we focus on malware that may have direct psy-
chological and/or physical impacts on the users of hosts under
attack. This is different from malicious code indirectly causing
harm, e.g., by disrupting the power grid or a water treatment
plant. In particular, we set out to study the feasibility of attacks
developed to control consumer devices and make them repro-
duce sound that is likely to be imperceptible to a significant
proportion of the population at both high (17kHz–21kHz) and
low (60Hz–100Hz) frequencies, but also possibly damaging to
them. If such noise is emitted at sufficient levels, and for suf-
ficient periods of time, a number of short-term and long-term
adverse physical and psychological effects may occur, affect-
ing users of that device as well as those nearby (see Section 2
for a primer on high- and low-frequency noise and their ad-
verse affects).
We rely on an experimental methodology to design and de-
ploy a range of attacks on a variety of devices and take sound
measurements in an anechoic chamber in order to assess the
capabilities of a sample of consumer equipment both in terms
of the frequencies and sound levels achievable. We first report
on a few smart devices, whereby smart here denotes devices
with a remote or local network interface, including Internet-
connected speakers and headphones. For comparison, we also
run attacks against more “traditional” devices – namely, para-
metric and vibration speakers, a loudspeaker, and a vehicle-
mounted PA system – which rely on intended control channels
like Bluetooth, or on physical access to the device in question.
Overall, we show that we can indeed re-purpose some de-
vices for local or remote acoustic attacks by an attacker with
the objective of causing direct harm to humans. One of our
attacks depends on a known vulnerability in a specific device,
while the others use customized malware relying on common
functionalities to manipulate system volumes and taking ad-
vantage of the ability of consumer audio equipment to repro-
duce sound at low and high frequencies. Of the ten device
set-ups tested, four (two smart, two traditional) were capable
of emitting high-frequency noise (HFN) and/or low-frequency
noise (LFN), at levels which exceed published guidelines relat-
ing to the maximum recommended levels. More specifically, a
smart speaker and a headphones set did that for both HFN and
LFN; a parametric speaker for HFN only; and a loudspeaker
for LFN only.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to
demonstrate the feasibility of extending malware and cyber-
attacks into the field of acoustic weapons. Also note that all
the devices we experiment with are publicly available, rela-
tively modern and inexpensive, and commonly purchased in
both home and business contexts. For safety reasons, we do
not provide full details of these devices.
We also show that attacks such as these can, in some cases,
have unintended but significant effects on the physical equip-
ment itself; we were able to cause permanent damage to
the smart speaker, preventing it from reproducing frequencies
above 5kHz, by playing a particular frequency for a few min-
utes at maximum volume. This was disclosed to the manufac-
turer, who subsequently notified us that a mitigation would be
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applied to address this issue. Finally, we discuss a number of
possible countermeasures, including an open-source applica-
tion which can be used to detect exposure to audio at specified
frequencies.
2 Background
HFN and LFN. Frequencies believed to be above or below
the range of human hearing are often defined as ultrasonic or
infrasonic, respectively. More specifically, the former encom-
pass higher frequencies, usually 20kHz and higher [33], while
the latter are in the range 0–20Hz [45]. However, as high-
lighted by Duck and Leighton [19], founding a definition on
a lack of a property (namely, non-audibility) is problematic,
particularly with a concept that is highly subjective. In this pa-
per, we focus on High-Frequency Noise (HFN) in the 17kHz–
21kHz range, due to the reported capacity of some consumer
devices, such as mobile phones, to produce noise at approxi-
mately these frequencies [21, 43], as well as Low-Frequency
Noise (LFN), typically described as 20– 200Hz [15, 10, 8, 68].
However, for the latter, we restrict testing to the 60–100Hz
range, following the results of a pilot study, presented in 4.1,
which indicated that available devices would not be capable of
reproducing lower frequencies.
Hearing Thresholds. A common misconception is that
healthy humans are unable to perceive noise above a 20kHz
threshold or below 20Hz [20]. However, perceptibility does
not solely depend on theoretically defined cut-off points. In
fact, the mechanisms of perception of both low and high fre-
quencies are complex and not fully understood [37], and, there
is a significant amount of variation in the ability of people to
detect HFN and LFN [72, 43, 45]. For instance, some indi-
viduals have reportedly been able to hear frequencies above
17.8kHz [19] or higher [18, 37, 55], or down to 1.5Hz in cer-
tain conditions [44]. To a large extent, this depends on a num-
ber of factors, including the sound pressure level (SPL), lev-
els of background noise, etc. Additionally, lower frequencies
may be perceived, but not necessarily as “sound” [45], and the
generation of high frequencies may cause subharmonics in the
audible range [33, 19, 5]. However, there is a general con-
sensus that the likelihood that people can hear sounds declines
non-linearly with increasingly higher [5] and lower frequen-
cies [52] and that, for the former, hearing thresholds gener-
ally increase with age [72, 46]. Put simply, it is likely that
many people, particularly older adults, cannot hear sound at
the ranges we test in this paper.
Adverse Effects of HFN/LFN. HFN and LFN have both
been associated with adverse physiological and psychologi-
cal effects. However, as with perceptibility, susceptibility is
again likely to differ significantly between individuals [42, 61].
While there have been no reports of high frequencies caus-
ing permanent hearing loss [33], there have been numerous
reported cases of ultrasound having adverse effects on hear-
ing [19], including temporary threshold shifts [1]; reductions
in hearing sensitivity in the audible range [46, 14, 79, 24];
neurasthenia, cardiac neurosis, hypotension, bradycardia, and
functional changes in cardiovascular and central nervous sys-
tems [66]. Permanent threshold shifts have only been associ-
ated with high frequency exposure in the presence of high lev-
els of lower frequencies [43]. High frequencies have also been
linked to more subjective effects, including nausea, fatigue,
and headaches [19, 76, 33]; tinnitus and ear pain [14, 22]; irri-
tation [70]; somnolence, dizziness, palpitations, and decreased
concentration [66].
Although LFN has been associated with temporary thresh-
old shifts [45], and some correlation observed with various
conditions such as heart ailments, chronic insomnia [48], and
elevated levels of cortisol [8], annoyance is often the most
common response [67, 58, 56, 68]. Other subjective effects
include headaches and palpitations [50]; deterioration in task
performance [9, 8]; decreased productivity [34]; and lower lev-
els of cooperation and agreeableness [77]. These subjective
effects are often reported even at relatively moderate levels of
between 40 and 45 dB(A) [8, 77, 56, 57], with noise sensitivity
reported to be a consistent predictor of depressive symptoms
and psychological distress [67].
Remarks. It is crucial to highlight that there are often issues
with definitively establishing a causal relationship between
HFN and LFN and adverse effects. Data is often sparse and
anecdotal [43], and detailed knowledge of the “noise dose” –
including both the level and the duration of the exposure – is
required in order to evaluate effects [3, 18]. This data is of-
ten unavailable, and has not been explored in detail [41]. In
fact, many effects have not been successfully reproduced in
laboratory settings [23], although this may be in part due to
ethical restrictions on exposing human subjects to potentially
dangerous SPLs [43, 22, 23], or to the possibility of nocebo
effects [23]. However, as pointed out by Leighton [43], while
it is not possible to make definitive statements about causality,
there exists a significant evidence base for the threat of ad-
verse effects at lower intensities in a subset of the population.
Moreover, these threats are sufficiently evidenced that a num-
ber of organizations and researchers have developed guidelines
detailing recommended maximum permissible exposure levels
for both HFN and LFN.
Exposure Guidelines. Most exposure guidelines, particularly
for for HFN, have been developed for occupational use [43].
There are often significant differences in the way these levels
are calculated and implemented, and in the proposed recom-
mendations for comparison and evaluation against them. In
this paper, we will not assess the merits, or lack thereof, of in-
dividual guidelines, but will instead use them to compare our
generated levels.
Leighton [42] presents a compendium of maximum permis-
sible sound pressure levels (MPSPLs), the means and medi-
ans of which are reported in Table 1. As noted in Leighton’s
follow-up work [43], many of these guidelines are based on
small samples, often only including adult males and predomi-
nantly focusing on occupational environments rather than pub-
lic exposure. Although the research base may be too small to
support such guidelines [42], there is, at least, something of
a consensus [33], particularly for the fact that A-weighting –
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(kHz) 8 10 12.5 16 20 25 31.5 40 50
Mean 80.00 83.08 82.67 83.89 96.91 111.08 113.91 114.09 115.28
Median 80.00 80.00 80.00 80.00 105.00 110.00 110.00 110.00 110.00
Table 1: Mean and median of maximum permissible sound pressure
levels (MPSPLs), for different frequencies, as per [42].
commonly used for exposure guidelines in the audible range
– is limited, as it significantly underestimates higher frequen-
cies [41, 43]. Our measurements are taken using Z-weighting
– a flat frequency response 10Hz–20kHz, which, unlike A-
weighting, does not apply any attenuation for sounds above
or below the commonly understood “audible range.” In Sec-
tion 5, we will compare to the various guidelines using this
weighting, with notation LZeq.
We are unaware of any similar compendium relating to
safety guidelines regarding exposure to LFN. However, several
bodies have published reference curves for the assessment of
disturbance caused by LFN. Unfortunately, the methods used
to calculate these curves differ significantly. For our analysis,
we use a reference curve proposed in 2011 [51], reported in
Table 2, which was devised after an assessment of previously
published reference curves. This reference curve proposes the
use of Leq. Since no weighting is applied, we measure and
compare our results using LAeq in third-octave bands (TOBs).
There is a general consensus that A-weighting may underesti-
mate the effects of LFN [45, 73, 36] due to its attenuation at
lower frequencies, so this should be taken into account when
reviewing our results in Section 5.
3 Related work
High-Frequency Noise (HFN). Previous work has studied
HFN in the context of enabling or supplementing attacks.
More specifically, researchers have used ultrasound to create
covert communication channels [29, 80, 17], finding that many
consumer devices are capable of emitting HFN [43, 21]. Other
research involving HFN includes the disruption of obstacle-
detection systems by introducing attacker-controlled ultra-
sound to perform echolocation jamming [81, 80]. Also, Bolton
et al. [11] explore the capability of both audible and inaudible
noise to corrupt data being written to hard disk drives, while
Mavroudis et al. [47] first and Cunche et al. [16] later inves-
tigate the use of ultrasonic beacons as tracking devices in the
context of targeted marketing, exploring related privacy im-
plications. Finally, we are not aware of any security-related
research into the use of low frequencies.
Physical Harm. Researchers have examined the ways in
which malware could be used to cause physical harm in a num-
ber of contexts, e.g., embedded medical devices [27, 78, 65].
Depending on the specific device and context, an attacker can
cause significant, life-threatening harm by exploiting vulnera-
bilities in such systems. Other research in a similar vein has
explored the physical risks posed by vulnerabilities in trans-
port systems, such as connected cars [7] or air traffic control
systems [12], as well as the manipulation of IoT devices to
(Hz) 10 12.5 16 20 25 31.5 40 50 63 80 100 125 160
92 87 83 74 64 56 49 43 42 40 38 36 34
Table 2: Reference curve by Moorhouse et al. [51] for assessing LFN.
Levels shown as Leq in centered third-octave bands (TOBs).
force them to strike humans [62].
Overall, there has been little research on the ability of at-
tackers to directly harm users through malware and other at-
tacks, i.e., by manipulating the ordinary outputs of devices to
cause adverse effects. One exception appears to be work on
the inducement of epileptic seizures. Poulsen [60] reports on a
series of attacks against a forum for epilepsy sufferers: attack-
ers uploaded flashing images, successfully causing a number
of seizures in forum users. Oluwafemi et al. [54] and Ronen
and Shamir [64] also discuss vulnerabilities in connected light-
ing devices, finding that an attacker can cause vulnerable sys-
tems to flash in patterns consistent with those known to induce
seizures. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to examine the feasibility of acoustic attacks using malware or
cyber-attacks.
Acoustic Weapons. Perhaps as a result of a substantial, al-
beit often anecdotal, evidence base, there has been significant
historical interest in the development of devices that could be
used to deliberately expose people to harmful levels of sound.
This topic has been the subject of frequent misunderstandings
and rumors [74, 52], and while it is generally agreed that, in
principle, acoustic weapons could be used to covertly generate
adverse effects in humans [43, 4], there would be significant
practical problems in deploying such devices, which serves as
motivation to our work.
Altmann [2] notes that threshold shifts, not being immedi-
ately felt or causing an immediate impact, would be of lit-
tle interest to those deploying acoustic weapons, and that it
would be challenging to cause targeted, directional effects.
Bartholomew and Perez [6] agree with the latter point, ar-
guing that the need for close proximity, the required size of
the acoustic weapon, and the rapid diffusion of ultrasound,
would make such weapons impractical. However, as our re-
sults suggest, the deployment of acoustic attacks in the context
of cyber-attacks could to some extent negate these disadvan-
tages. Attackers may be able to affect victims over extended
periods of time, particularly as users of consumer devices are
typically within fairly close proximity to them, often for long
periods. Therefore, concerns over practicality with regards to
size and diffusion would seem less relevant with the advent of
smart devices.
Remarks. Overall, while previous work has explored the abil-
ity of cyber-attacks to cause physical or psychological harm to
users, there has not yet, to the best of our knowledge, been any
empirical work on the capacity of malware to create localized
acoustic weapons.
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4 Methodology
We now present our methodology to assess the feasibility of
acoustic attacks on commodity hardware. We do so on several
commonly purchased and publicly available “smart” devices
that can produce sound, namely: laptops, mobile phones, and
smart speakers. We also include a pair of smart headphones in
this category. (Overall, smart here denotes devices with a re-
mote or local network interface, including Internet-connected
speakers and headphones.) As a comparison, we also use more
traditional audio equipment: parametric speakers, loudspeak-
ers, vibration speakers, and a vehicle-mounted PA system.
As detailed in this section, our methodology involves: (1)
designing and deploying attacks to target each device in our
testbed, (2) forcing them to play pre-prepared audio of selected
low and high frequency tones, and (3) measuring the results
using sound level meters in an anechoic chamber.
4.1 Pilot study
In order to obtain an initial indication as to whether consumer
devices were indeed capable of producing HFN and LFN, we
conducted a pilot study using four of the selected devices: a
laptop, mobile phone, loudspeaker, and smart speaker. The
experiments were also conducted in the anechoic chamber
used for our full study, using the same proof-of-concept at-
tacks (presented in Section 4.3). As the goal was not to pre-
cisely measure audio emissions, but to simply assess whether
the devices could reproduce the required frequencies, we used
two publicly available Android apps, Ultrasound Detector [26]
and Infrasound Detector [25], and a factory-calibrated Dayton
Audio iMM-6 external microphone connected to an Android
phone. This is reasonable as modern smartphones are gener-
ally considered suitable for occupational noise measurements,
within the limitations of the device in question [35].
Our findings showed that, while all the devices appeared
to be capable of reproducing HFN, from around 60.5dBSPL
to 91.5dBSPL, only the smart speaker and loudspeaker were
capable of reproducing LFN at a reasonable level (50Hz at
63.4dBSPL).
We also observed a distinct increase in temperature in the
smart speaker, following the production of HFN at maximum
volume. More specifically, the speaker became noticeably hot
to the touch and gave off a strong odor of burnt plastic after
the HFN testing runs. However, we did not observe any smoke
or flame coming from the device, and assumed that the pro-
duction of HFN at maximum volume had caused some form of
internal damage to an electronic component. As a result of this
observation, we opted to include heat measurements in our full
study.
Moreover, some time after the pilot study, we noticed that
the speaker’s ability to reproduce higher frequencies had been
impaired.
4.2 Experimental Setup
Testing Environment. Our experiments were conducted in
an anechoic chamber at our institution. While this was neces-
sary in order to accurately and safely measure emitted noise,
it should be noted that in a real-world environment, ambi-
ent sounds and certain types of environment may amplify or
reduce the effects of LFN or HFN. Owing to the nature of
the study, and the reported association between high levels of
LFN/HFN and adverse effects on people, we did not use hu-
man subjects for this research; instead, we measured the sound
emitted from each device as a consequence of the attacks, and
assessed whether or not the resulting levels exceeded published
maximum permissible levels.
Ethics. A full risk assessment was conducted prior to the ex-
periment, and ethics approval was obtained from our institu-
tion.
Device Set-Ups. Our experiments involved: 1) a Windows lap-
top, 2) an Android smartphone, 3) a pair of wireless over-ear
headphones, 4) a smart speaker, 5) a loudspeaker, 6) a vibra-
tion speaker, 7) a parametric speaker, and 8) a vehicle-mounted
PA system. To minimize risks to the general public, we do not
include details of specific brands and models, or the code for
our attacks.
In addition to the attacks developed for each device, we also
expanded our testbed to include 9) three Windows laptops and
10) three Android smartphones, which were attacked at the
same time during the test. We included these additional tests
to assess the scalability of the attacks, given that in some en-
vironments, e.g., open-plan offices, several such devices might
realistically be in close proximity to each other. In that case,
the resulting levels may increase [28] and thus their effects as
well.
Procedure. We placed each device inside an anechoic cham-
ber, along with a Class I sound level meter, spot-calibrated by
the supplier, and placed at a distance of one meter from the
device. For the HFN tests, we used a Svantek 977A sound
level meter with GRAS 40AM microphone, and a Svantek 979
sound level meter with GRAS 40AE microphone for the LFN
tests. Each device was made to play or stream a WAV audio
file, generated online1, with a sine wave tone at a sample rate
of 44.1kHz at a single frequency. We initiated each tone on
each device for a period of ten minutes, while the chamber
remained shut, using a specific attack developed to test that
particular device, as discussed later in Section 4.3. Following
each ten-minute period, the anechoic chamber was opened and
readings were taken from the sound level meter.
We also measured the surface temperature of each device us-
ing an infrared thermometer, before and after each testing pe-
riod, to assess whether the production of LFN or HFN caused
an increase in temperature. We report these measurements in
Section 5.4.
Frequency Measurements. Note that all but one of the fre-
quencies being tested was below 20kHz, thus, we took mea-
surements using Z weighting (a flat frequency response in the
band 10Hz–20kHz) in these cases. For test runs involving the
ultrasonic frequency (21kHz), we used a proprietary high-pass
filter weighting developed by the sound level meter manufac-
1https://www.audiocheck.net
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turer, known as HPE (high-pass extended). For test runs in-
volving LFN, our original intention was to use G-weighting,
which is the ISO 7196:1995 standard for measuring infrasound
in the band 1Hz–20Hz. However, the results of our pilot study
indicated that many consumer devices were not capable of
producing noise in this range. Therefore, we increased the
frequencies being tested to 60Hz, 80Hz, and 100Hz. These
still fall within most definitions of LFN and are still associated
with reported adverse effects, as discussed in Section 3, but are
not infrasonic, and were thus suitable for Z-weighted measure-
ments rather than G-weighting, which is designed exclusively
for infrasound [37].
4.3 Attacks on Smart Devices
Smart Speaker. Our attack against the smart speaker relied
on a (previously disclosed) vulnerability affecting a number of
smart audio products; specifically, that no authentication is re-
quired between the smart speaker and the controller. That is,
they simply need to be on the same local network. As previ-
ously discussed, we do not disclose details of specific models
affected for safety reasons, however, we can say that our exper-
iments are performed on a speaker released a couple of years
ago for around $200.
In theory, exploiting this vulnerability requires an attacker
to be joined and authenticated to the user’s WiFi network, and
therefore nearby. However, a number of these smart speakers
are exposed on the Internet, even though remote access is not
the default configuration of the speakers. Indeed, a query on
the search engine Shodan for the brand name and port asso-
ciated with the smart speaker showed that over 5,000 results
in five countries, as of Spring 2019, meaning that an attacker
could find and remotely control these devices without authen-
tication, including launching our attack.
To execute that, we wrote a Python script which scans the
current local network for smart speakers of a particular brand.
If any are found, and are inactive, the script retrieves the cur-
rent volume level as an integer and stores it as a variable, raises
the volume to maximum, and streams a requested WAV file
hosted on a web server controlled by the attacker.
Headphones. We also used wireless headphones (released ap-
proximately two years ago, costing around $400). Note that
we did not attack the headphones directly, but tested the capa-
bility of the headphones to reproduce HFN and LFN using the
Windows malware described above, by connecting the head-
phones to the laptop over Bluetooth. Whilst some of the “tra-
ditional” devices we test also use Bluetooth, headphones are
reported to be increasingly attached to smart devices [71, 49]
and so we include them in the “smart” category, as attacks us-
ing headphones are not reliant on attacking an intended con-
trolled channel such as Bluetooth, but could be achieved by
attacking a smart device to which they may be attached. Un-
like the other tests, where the sound level sensors were placed
one meter away from the device, here we placed them approx-
imately one centimeter from the headphone’s speakers, aiming
to simulate as closely as possible the effect a user would expe-
rience while wearing the device.
Windows Laptop. We developed proof-of-concept Windows
malware, with WAV files corresponding to each target fre-
quency embedded in the malware as resource files. The mal-
ware contacts a simple command-and-control server to retrieve
commands. If the command to play a specific frequency is
received, the malware will store the current volume level as
an integer, increase the volume to maximum, and play the re-
quested tone. Upon receiving the ’stop’ command, the mal-
ware will restore the volume level to its previous value. For
our extended test using three laptops, we infected each ma-
chine with the same proof-of-concept malware and controlled
all the infected hosts simultaneously using the same C2 server.
Note that we experiment on mid-range laptops released a cou-
ple of years ago, priced in the order of $1,000.
Android Phone. We also developed a proof-of-concept An-
droid app to simulate a malware-infected phone, with WAV
files corresponding to each target frequency embedded in the
malware as resource files. This app has the same function-
ality as that described for the Windows laptop malware, and
our extended test using three phones similarly employed si-
multaneous remote control using one C2 server. Again, we
used mid-range phones released about two years ago, priced at
around $200.
4.4 Attacks on Traditional Devices
Vibration Speaker and Loudspeaker. Vibration speakers
differ from traditional speakers in that they do not use a di-
aphragm cone. Instead, the speaker’s coil is fixed to a movable
plate, which pushes against the surface the speaker is placed
on, causing that surface to vibrate and emit sound. Due to the
lack of a diaphragm, these speakers typically have a smaller
profile and can be attached to a variety of surfaces unobtru-
sively, possibly making them an attractive choice as repur-
posed acoustic weapons – either through an attacker execut-
ing an attack against another user’s device, or purchasing and
using their own.
The vibration speaker we used was controlled through Blue-
tooth, as was the loudspeaker. For both of these devices, we
paired the speaker to the Android phone and used our Android
malware to play the targeted tones through these speakers. The
loudspeaker model is about two years old and costs around
$50, while the vibration speaker model is five years old and
cost around $70.
Parametric Speaker. Parametric speakers use ultrasonic car-
rier waves, typically at 40kHz, to transmit high-intensity di-
rectional audio in a relatively small area of focus, essentially
creating a “beam” of sound (please refer to [59] for further de-
tails on the operation of parametric arrays). These devices are
often used to transmit focused advertisements or informational
messages at trade shows or retail stores, or to create the (audi-
tory) illusion of sound appearing to come from another source.
Note that the speaker we used has no smart capabilities and
no remote or local command channels; instead, a standard
3.5mm audio cable is used to connect the speaker to an au-
dio source. For our tests, we connected this speaker to our
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Windows laptop and used the Windows malware to play the
targeted tones through the speaker. As this speaker is known
to use 40kHz carrier waves, we also measured its emissions
at this frequency using the HPE filter. This device is roughly
the size of a mobile phone, and available for purchase online
at a moderate cost, around $250, therefore, it could be used
as a low-cost portable acoustic weapon by an attacker – par-
ticularly as the directional nature of the transmitted audio may
allow them to target a specific location.
PA System. Finally, we used a vehicle-mounted PA system,
which, like the parametric speaker, has no network interfaces.
It automatically plays audio upon inserting a storage device,
e.g., a USB drive or a SD card. For each test, we placed an
audio file on a USB drive that was plugged into the device. So
that we could exit the anechoic chamber safely, the recording
had a thirty second delay before the ten minutes of a given tone
were played.
An attacker seeking to attack this particular system would
therefore need to have physical access to the device, have a
pre-prepared storage device containing audio in the required
format, and be able to insert that storage device into the system
without arousing suspicion. Alternatively, as with the paramet-
ric speaker, the attacker could purchase a similar device with
the intention of using it as a ‘mobile’ acoustic weapon when
mounted on a vehicle.
Additional attacks. We devised two more possible attacks
in addition to those described in Section 4.3, which, rather
than targeting specific devices, would be suitable for deploy-
ment generally. However, as these would have utilized the
same audio components being tested, and since they rely on
targeted users having their volume set high enough to cause
harm, we did not include them in our testing plan. Neverthe-
less, they might remain plausible attack scenarios, thus, we
briefly discuss them here. The first additional attack relies on
the HTML5 audio tag; specifically, the autoplay attribute. In
this instance, an attacker would need to persuade a victim to
visit a particular attacker-controlled server, and a selected tone
hosted on the attacker’s server would autoplay at whatever
volume is currently set, without the user’s knowledge—even
though, depending on the browser being used, a small speaker
icon might appear on the relevant tab. As it is not possible for
code on a webpage to manipulate a user’s system volume, the
efficacy of this attack, in terms of causing harmful levels of
audio, depends on the volume set on the user’s device.
Another attack involves the deliberate manipulation and in-
sertion of particular audio into a pre-existing audio track. Here
the attacker may have access to a legitimate audio file that
they know an intended victim will play at some point. This
could be, for instance, a YouTube video, a film soundtrack, or
some other audio. Using an audio editor, the attacker could
decrease the level of the legitimate audio, and insert an ultra-
sonic or low-frequency tone of their choosing at a much higher
level. Upon playing the manipulated file, the user is likely
to assume that they do not have their system volume turned
up high enough, or that the legitimate audio was not recorded
at sufficient levels, and as a result may significantly increase
their system volume – leading to exposure to potentially harm-
ful levels of the attacker-selected tone. As with the previous
attack, this approach would require the system volume of the
device in question to be high enough to emit harmful levels of
audio.
Remarks. Our primary interest in developing these attacks
was to assess whether the proliferation of smart devices could
provide a new avenue for potentially harmful acoustic attacks.
Overall, our attacks are realistically viable in the wild and po-
tentially very harmful. In addition to many of the smart de-
vices we tested being ubiquitous in a number of diverse en-
vironments, including homes, businesses, and public or social
events, note that many of the attack vectors are “generic.” For
instance, there are multiple ways to deploy malware infections
on a laptop or mobile phone, and other devices, such as the
headphones, could be used for attacks arising from a number
of vectors.
We also experiment with a number of traditional devices.
These attacks are perhaps less realistic, lacking vulnerable
control channels and connectivity and typically requiring ei-
ther physical access or close proximity, as well the ability to
pair with an unpaired Bluetooth device. However, we include
them in our testing both as a comparison to the tested smart
devices, and to investigate whether the abuse of more tradi-
tional consumer equipment may also be an attractive avenue
for attackers.
5 Experimental Evaluation
We now present the results of our experiments and the related
measurements.
Overview. Overall, we find that several devices (two smart,
one traditional) were capable of producing HFN at levels ex-
ceeding many of the recommended exposure limits, and are
therefore potentially able to cause temporary and permanent
harm, depending on the circumstances and duration of expo-
sure. Additionally, a number of devices (two smart, one tra-
ditional) were capable of producing levels at or above LFN
limits.
Our experiments highlight a tendency for devices to perform
better at lower high frequencies (such as 17kHz) and higher
low frequencies (100Hz). This may present an attacker with
a disadvantage if they select these frequencies, as lower HFN
and higher LFN may be more likely to be perceived by users.
An exception was the parametric speaker, which performed
better at higher frequencies, presumably due to its array of ul-
trasonic transducers.
5.1 High Frequency Noise
As discussed in Section 2, we used the compendium of MP-
SPLs for airborne ultrasound in Leighton [42] to assess the ca-
pability of the devices to reproduce HFN. Results are reported
in Table 3, which show several results exceeding the mean av-
erage of these MPSPLs at relevant frequencies.
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17kHz 19kHz 21kHz(HPE) 40kHz
Smart speaker 86 35.2 43.8 -
Headphones 87.5 81.2 79.8 -
Laptop 63 64.5 45.5 -
Mobile phone 59.4 58.3 16.9 -
3 laptops 65.6 63.8 57.5 -
3 phones 59.8 61.1 45.3 -
Loudspeaker 59.4 48.5 54.5 -
Vehicle PA 75.3 20.5 18.5 -
Vibration speaker 47.7 36.1 27.3 -
Parametric speaker 85.1 84.2 97.1 117.7
Table 3: Levels observed during our HFN trials. Levels (LZeq in
centered TOBs) which exceed the mean and/or median average of
MPSPLs in Leighton [42]’s guidelines are in bold.
Note that the smart speaker produced a high of 86dB (all
results LZeq) at 17kHz, but subsequent HFN trials produced
much lower levels. This is due to the result of internal damage
caused to the speaker during the experiment, which we discuss
in Section 5.4. Taking the TOB center of 16kHz, this exceeds
both the mean and median averages of the MPSLs reported by
Leighton [42].
Moreover, we found that the headphones produced a mean
average of 82.83dB for the HFN trials, with a high of 87.5dB
at 17kHz. Taking the TOB center of 16kHz, this also exceeds
both the mean and median average levels.
The parametric speaker produced a mean average of
88.80dB for the HFN trials, with a high of 97.1dB at 21kHz. A
high of 117.7dB was observed at 40kHz during the 21kHz trial.
The 17kHz experiment, taking a TOB center of 16kHz, ex-
ceeded the mean and median average MPSPLs, and the 21kHz
result exceeded the mean average for MPSPLs at TOB cen-
ter 20kHz. Finally, the 40kHz result (TOB center 40kHz) ex-
ceeded both the mean and median MPSPLs, indicating that
the speaker’s ultrasonic carrier waves at 40kHz could present
a health risk.
5.2 Low Frequency Noise
LFN tests generally produced lower levels than the HFN tests.
However, as many researchers report [8, 77, 56, 57], adverse
psychological effects associated with low frequency sound are
often observed at relatively moderate levels.
To compare our results to the LFN reference curve [51], we
apply A-weighting to the levels observed at TOB center fre-
quencies, as shown in Table 4. It should be noted that A-
weighting results in significant attenuation at lower frequen-
cies, down to -26.2dB in the 63Hz centered TOB (the lowest
band used in our analysis), and as much as -85.4dB at 6.3Hz.
As a result, the A-weighted levels are significantly lower than
our Z-weighted measurements.
The loudspeaker produced a mean average of 51.13dB (all
results LAeq) for the LFN trials, with a high of 64.2dB at
100Hz. The results for the 80Hz and 100Hz trials, taking the
TOB centers of 80Hz and 100Hz, produce A-weighted levels
exceeding those proposed in the reference curve. The smart
60Hz 80Hz 100Hz
Smart speaker 47.5 59 71.6
Headphones 37.5 39.9 40.2
Laptop 2 0.1 3
Mobile phone 1 1.2 6.5
3 laptops 1.4 -0.3 4.7
3 phones 3.3 1.6 12.5
Loudspeaker 38.2 51 64.2
Vehicle PA 13.7 22.6 33.7
Vibration speaker 24 21.1 18.4
Parametric speaker -0.6 0.5 28.6
Table 4: Levels observed during our LFN trials. Levels (LAeq in
centered TOBs) exceeding the reference curve values are in bold.
TOB Center (Hz) Level
Smart speaker (60Hz) 200 64.2
Smart speaker (80Hz) 160 72.5
Smart speaker (100Hz) 200 73.5
Smart speaker (17kHz) 6,300 75.1
Headphones 100Hz 125 39.5
Headphones (17kHz) 12,500 44.2
Headphones (19kHz) 1,000 23.6
Headphones (21kHz) 1,250 23.9
Loudspeaker (80Hz) 250 65.6
Loudspeaker (100Hz) 500 69.0
Vehicle PA (17kHz) 1,600 60.8
Parametric speaker (17kHz) 12,500 74.3
Parametric speaker (19kHz) 12,500 71.2
Parametric speaker (21kHz) 12,500 69.4
Parametric speaker (40kHz) 12,500 75.2
Table 5: Components outside our tested ranges, observed during LFN
and HFN trials, between 125Hz and 12500Hz TOB centers. Levels
shown in LZeq.
speaker produced a mean average of 59.37dB for the LFN tri-
als, with a high of 71.6dB at 100Hz. All three tests for this
device exceed the corresponding levels proposed in the curve
for the TOB center frequencies. Finally, the headphones pro-
duced a mean average of 39.2dB for the LFN trials, with a high
of 40.2dB at 100Hz. Taking a TOB center frequency of 100Hz,
this exceeds the corresponding level in the reference curve.
5.3 Audible Components
In some cases, we observed that additional components outside
our tested ranges, and therefore more likely to be audible, were
also generated at significant levels. The highest levels, i.e.,
between 125Hz and 12500Hz (TOB centers), are reported in
Table 5 for each device tested.
Note that sounds at other frequencies may not always
present a significant obstacle to an attacker. The headphones,
for instance, produced relatively low noise at other frequen-
cies, which would likely go unnoticed. However, other devices
produced substantial noise at other frequencies. The paramet-
ric speaker in particular produced sound of relatively high lev-
els at 12.5kHz. Therefore, these issues may present significant
obstacles to an attacker wishing to remain covert, depending
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HFN (kHz) LFN (Hz)
17kHz 19kHz 21kHz 21kHz 60Hz 80Hz 100Hz
(HPE)
Laptop 0.8 0.1 0.9 1 0.8 0 0.1
Mobile phone 0.7 1.1 -1.7 0 1.1 0.1 -0.1
Loudspeaker 1.6 0.6 0 0.1 0.8 2.6 0.8
Smart speaker 4.8 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 9.2 -1.7 0.8
Headphones 0.2 0.4 1 0 0.8 0.5 0.2
3 Laptops 2 0.4 0 0.2 2.4 1.3 0
3 Phones 0 1 0 0.7 0.9 2.3 0.1
Vehicle PA -0.1 0.2 -0.4 0.2 20.9 3.7 8.2
Parametric speaker 4.7 4.2 3.8 8 3.3 0.6 0.4
Vibration speaker 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.7 2.8 2
Table 6: Temperature changes in degrees Celsius following readings
taken before and after each ten-minute trial.
on variables such as ambient noise, the environment, and the
ability of users to perceive sounds at certain frequencies.
5.4 Temperature and Damage
As mentioned earlier, we also took temperature calculations,
which we report in Table 6. These are calculated by subtract-
ing the post-trial measurement from the pre-trial one, in de-
grees Celsius, and reveal significant temperature increases in
the vehicle-mounted PA system during the emission of LFN,
and some smaller increases with both the parametric and smart
speakers during both the LFN and HFN tests.
We could not replicate the significant temperature increases
observed in the smart speaker during the pilot study. How-
ever, we did note a similar burning odor following the HFN test
runs for the smart speaker, and observed a similar degradation
in performance. Examining the time history from the sound
level meter logs allowed us to investigate this further, and we
noted that the speaker appeared to have experienced a marked
and critical decrease in performance after approximately five
minutes of emitting a 17kHz tone at maximum volume, from
which the speaker did not recover.
To assess the damage to the smart speaker, we made two
recordings of an audio track – a piece of popular music –
played through a newly purchased smart speaker, in the ane-
choic chamber. One recording was made before testing, and
the other after the HFN test runs had been completed. Com-
paring the recordings, we observed a significant decrease in
the quality of the sound. Further examination using spectro-
grams, shown in Fig. 1, show that the speaker appeared to
have lost the ability to reproduce frequencies above approxi-
mately 5kHz. This effect, which may be the result of some
sort of internal overheating or similar damage, appears to be
permanent.
5.5 Disclosure
Following our discovery that playing HFN at maximum vol-
ume appeared to have caused permanent damage to the smart
speaker, affecting the speaker’s ability to reproduce frequen-
cies higher than approximately 5kHz, we informed the manu-
facturer in the spirit of responsible disclosure. We found the
manufacturer to be responsive and, upon their request, pro-
vided them with additional data in order to replicate the issue.
We received notification approximately two months after ini-
tial disclosure that an update would be rolled out in early 2019
to resolve the problem, however, at the time of writing, this has
not yet been confirmed.
Also note that we are not aware of any mitigation being ap-
plied to address the known issue of unauthenticated control, be
it on a local network or remotely if a speaker is exposed on the
Internet.
We have not disclosed issues relating to the emission of
HFN or LFN for any of the other devices as these are not ad-
dressable vulnerabilities as such. Rather, our attacks demon-
strate repurposing of intended functionality.
6 Discussion
We now provide a broader discussion of our work and its im-
plications.
6.1 Results
Out of the ten device set-ups we tested in our experiments,
we found that four (two smart, two traditional) were capable
of emitting HFN and/or LFN at levels exceeding the averages
of those deemed permissible by various bodies such as those
referenced in Table 1. More precisely:
1. The smart speaker and the headphones exceeded levels
for both HFN and LFN;
2. The parametric speaker for HFN;
3. The loudspeaker for LFN.
In particular, the headphones produced HFN at high levels
across all three tested frequencies, and LFN at 100Hz. The
smart speaker also produced HFN at high levels at 17kHz, and
LFN for all three tested frequencies.
Both of these devices could prove attractive to attackers
seeking to attack smart devices in order to produce acoustic
effects. Indeed, headphones are being increasingly used in de-
veloped countries [31], often at high volumes and associated
with decreased hearing acuity and hearing loss [71, 49], partic-
ularly among young people [75, 32]. Moreover, as mentioned
previously, they are often connected to devices such as lap-
tops, mobile phones, and tablets. Therefore, an attacker could
use malware payloads or remote attacks like those presented in
this paper to try and cause direct harm to headphone users.
There are also a number of other attacks, such as the browser
or audio manipulation techniques described in Section 4.4,
which could be used to target such users. A variation of the
laptop or phone attacks (presented in Section 4.3) could also
be used to trigger the delivery of sound only when the mal-
ware detects that headphones are attached.
It is also possible that the smart speaker is capable of pro-
ducing HFN at high levels, and our results indicate that this
appears the case for a short period of time. However, this led
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(a) Pre-Experiment
(b) Post-Experiment
Figure 1: Spectrograms in the audio editor software Audacity, for the pre-experiment recording (a) and post-experiment recording (b) of the
smart speaker.
to the speaker suffering permanent damage (see Section 5.4),
thereby presenting a separate risk: as these speakers do not
require authentication for control, an attacker on the local net-
work, or able to access a speaker remotely over the Internet,
can cause permanent damage to the device. This is a new
class of denial-of-service attack which we had not initially
considered, namely, the ability to remotely degrade or dam-
age equipment as a consequence of playing sounds in partic-
ular frequency ranges at high volume. In our pilot study, we
also found the smart speaker to get hot, but could not repli-
cate the issue; nonetheless, we leave it to future work to assess
whether an attacker could cause equipment to overheat, po-
tentially presenting fire hazards to users. That being said, we
hope that the mitigation promised by the manufacturer will ad-
dress these issues. It remains to be seen whether high HFN
and LFN levels can be produced after this mitigation has been
applied, and whether other speakers are also vulnerable in this
respect. Conversely, the parametric speaker, as a lightweight
and portable standalone device with no remote attack surface,
may be more suitable as a standalone low-cost HFN acoustic
weapon, particularly given its directional capability. In any
case, the use of this device in a public context may present a
health risk.
The loudspeaker was also capable of producing LFN at lev-
els in excess of those associated with annoyance, at two fre-
quencies. However, as a more traditional device, exploitation
of this speaker would present some challenges, and the attacker
would need to be both within a certain range and able to pair
to the speaker.
6.2 Attack Scenarios
Overall, there are several scenarios where an attacker may wish
to deploy attacks like the ones empirically demonstrated in our
experiments. The physical and subjective psychological ef-
fects associated with long-term exposure to high levels of high
or low frequency sound may be of interest to attackers wishing
to negatively affect, for instance, the performance of a particu-
lar employee, or an organization at scale using multiple infec-
tions and attacks.
If successful, the result of multiple people suffering from
noise-induced hearing loss, whether temporary or permanent,
in addition to possible negative psychological effects, could
have negative ramifications for an organization, vis-à-vis their
productivity or profitability. It would thus be possible for an at-
tack to not only rely on, e.g., espionage, data theft, or sabotage,
but also on acoustic attacks. It may also be possible for these
attacks to be used as part of a targeted harassment campaign
on an individual basis.
Additionally, as discussed in Section 3, there are potential
other uses of HFN for attacks, including covert exfiltration of
data; ultrasonic monitoring; and corruption of disk drives. De-
pending on the attacker’s motivations, these may be other at-
tractive solutions not necessarily constrained by human imper-
ceptibility of, or susceptibility to, HFN, or by MPSPLs.
6.3 Attack Feasibility
As the number of connected, audio-capable devices continues
to rise as a result of the proliferation of smart IoT devices and
an increasingly networked society, it is likely that the number
of devices vulnerable to these attacks will also rise. Therefore,
the attack surface for this class of attacks may also grow con-
siderably, and cases in which adversaries view such attacks as
a viable option may also increase.
The attacks and malware we developed for this study, while
only proof-of-concept and decidedly non-covert relative to
most “in-the wild” malware, were relatively easy to create and
deploy. It was not particularly difficult, for instance, to develop
malware that could be used to manipulate system volume, or
to attack a smart speaker and cause it to stream audio of our
choosing. Therefore, we argue that our work only scratches
the surface of what malware can achieve in terms of using con-
nected devices for acoustic attacks, and that, given the ease and
scale at which they could be deployed, the attacks discussed in
this paper should be of concern.
6.4 Limitations
Naturally, our work is not without limitations. Our experi-
ments were conducted on a relatively small scale and with a
limited number of devices, as we aimed to provide a feasibil-
ity study of an understudied problem. Moreover, due to con-
straints on the availability of the anechoic chamber, we lim-
ited our testing to short exposure times of ten minutes per fre-
quency per device. We hope that future research in this area
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will examine the effects of these attacks on equipment over
longer periods – as the consistent emission of HFN or LFN
at high volumes may significantly degrade electronic compo-
nents, rendering these attacks much less effective.
Moreover, to a large extent, successful acoustic attacks need
to rely on (a) the attacker being able to manipulate a given
device to emit sufficient levels of noise; (b) the victim not per-
ceiving the emitted audio; (c) the victim being susceptible to
the effects; and (d) the device being capable of producing high
levels over time. While we have empirically demonstrated (a),
and (d) to a certain extent, we acknowledge that further experi-
ments would be required with respect to (b) and (c) especially.
However, we are obviously constrained in carrying out these
experiments by ethics regarding human experimentation and
the safety of study participants.
Previous research has examined the effects of HFN and LFN
on humans, albeit at attenuated levels [22], which has allowed
us to extrapolate findings to real-world effects; this remains a
limitation both in terms of assessing actual effects and in de-
termining if the tones deployed, or artifacts thereof, would be
perceived. As discussed above, some (but not all) of the tested
devices emitted noise at frequencies and levels more likely to
be perceived, which could therefore compromise the covert na-
ture of the attacks.
7 Countermeasures
We now discuss possible avenues to mitigate the acoustic at-
tacks presented in this paper. Specifically, we consider spe-
cific countermeasures besides generic ones like restricting the
installation or the execution of unauthorized code.
One avenue would be to follow suggestions by Desho-
tels [17] about prevention/detection of imperceptible sound as
a covert channel. These include limiting the frequency range
of speakers to frequencies in the typically audible range; vis-
ibly alerting users when device speakers are in use; filtering
files during processing, such that frequencies outside the au-
dible range are removed; and, in the case of mobile devices,
implementing a permissions restriction on the use of speakers
by apps, so that a user has to manually approve this.
As a proof-of-concept, we adapted an existing open-source
software project2, originally intended to be a sound-activated
recorder and audio visualisation tool for Windows, to show
alerts when noise above certain frequency ranges and user-
specified thresholds is detected. Source code for this appli-
cation is available on request. Naturally, this approach does
rely on the capabilities of the microphone and soundcard on
the host, arguably making it somewhat unrealistic for every-
day consumer use, particularly in the case of true ultrasonic
sound, or lower frequency sound sub-50Hz.
A similar approach could be used for mobile-based detec-
tion. In our pilot study, we used two free Android apps from
the Google Play Store, along with a relatively inexpensive ex-
ternal microphone, and found that they were able to generate
2https://www.codeproject.com/Articles/22951/Sound-Activated-Recorder-
with-Spectrogram-in-C
alerts when sounds exceeded certain levels, particularly with
HFN. A wide range of other apps, for both iOS and Android,
may be suitable for noise measurements, as a low-cost alter-
native to traditional SLMs [35, 53, 63], albeit within device
limitations and with the caveat that there may be a decrease in
accuracy. While many of these apps do not target HFN or LFN
specifically, they may be able to generate alerts when certain
level thresholds are exceeded.
It also remains crucial that employers comply with appli-
cable legislation pertaining to acceptable noise limits. As
noted in Section 3, while a number of guidelines and mea-
surement and assessment criteria exist for both LFN and
HFN, researchers have argued that these may be inadequate
due to methodological issues [42], underestimation of ef-
fects [45, 73], and a lack of clarity on the applicability of oc-
cupational guidelines in other contexts, such as public expo-
sure [43].
An additional countermeasure could be to include heuris-
tic features in consumer and enterprise antivirus detection en-
gines, aiming to detect these attacks. For instance, certain be-
haviors, taken in combination, are often detected by antivirus
engines as suspicious, and the user may be presented with a
confirmation prompt to indicate whether or not this is expected
behavior [39]. In this context, there are few legitimate reasons
for applications to need to alter the system or media volume.
As mentioned in Section 5.5, we were informed that the is-
sue affecting the smart speaker, which enabled an attacker on
the same network or with remote access to the speaker (e.g.,
over the Internet, via DNS rebinding [30]) to cause perma-
nent damage to the device by playing HFN at high volumes,
would be resolved by the vendor, but at the time of writing this
has not been confirmed. In any case, we advise users owning
smart speakers that allow control of certain functions (play-
ing/streaming audio, changing volume) over a network to not
employ port forwarding or UPnP, which would expose their
speaker to potential remote attack. Where the control of such
speakers over an API remains unauthenticated, this may still
present a risk on a local network.
Finally, we argue that effective countermeasures mitigat-
ing the attacks presented in this paper could also be deployed
to detect covert transmissions using ultrasonic audio, an ac-
tive area of research as applied to both ultrasonic tracking,
with subsequent privacy applications [47], and to air-gap by-
passes [29, 17, 80].
8 Conclusion
This paper presented a novel class of attack, combining exist-
ing and new proof-of-concept malware and attacks to cause
ordinary consumer devices to produce high-frequency noise
(HFN) and low-frequency noise (LFN) at high levels. We
empirically verified these attacks on a number of commodity
hardware devices. Specifically, we found that a few devices
appear to be capable of producing potentially imperceptible
sounds at levels at or exceeding several recommended thresh-
olds, as a direct result.
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Like other researchers who previously attempted to exam-
ine the psychological and physical effects of high and low fre-
quencies on humans, we found that the lack of consensus for
established and adequate safety guidelines for HFN and LFN
frequencies represents a challenge toward assessing the real-
world consequences of these attacks.
As societies become more reliant on networks and connec-
tivity, and as digital and physical worlds become more in-
tegrated, we believe that attackers may become increasingly
interested in leveraging digital vulnerabilities against human
users. In this paper, we found that the triviality of executing
these attacks, and the size of the potential attack surface, could
mean that the repurposing of consumer equipment for acous-
tic attacks may be viable for attackers aiming to directly cause
harm to humans.
In future work, we plan to examine the capabilities of a
wider range of equipment, in a variety of environments and
at different distances. In particular, testing other smart speak-
ers and headphones will provide a better understanding of the
threats these devices may present. Moreover, for practical rea-
sons, we limited our research to an assessment of consumer
products which were relatively inexpensive and portable, and
took measurements in an anechoic chamber at a distance of
one meter. However, our attacks could be applied to larger
and more powerful equipment with the potential to affect many
more people in a wider area and to a much greater extent. For
instance, an attack against a connected PA system at a mu-
sic or sporting event, or against the speaker system in a vehi-
cle, could produce audio at much more harmful levels. Other,
more “noisy” channels, such as smart television broadcasts, or
injecting HFN or LFN into phone conversations, may also be
effective, particularly as the presence of other, more audible
frequencies in such channels may decrease the likelihood of
HFN/LFN being perceived by the victim.
We will also examine the applicability of these attacks to
offensive cyber-campaigns at scale. For instance, an attack
against an organization whereby many co-located user laptops
in an office environment are infected with a self-replicating
worm, using a payload similar to our proof-of-concept Win-
dows malware, could result in users being exposed to more
harmful levels of audio, for longer durations.
Availability. As mentioned earlier, we have not released the
code of our proof-of-concept attacks, nor the specifications of
the devices in our experiments, in order to minimize the risk to
the general public.
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